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Abstract
I investigate the behaviour of a multiproduct monopolist supply-
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the allocation of consumers across qualities is distorted by the price
schedule, or qualities are indeed lower than those supplied under social
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1 Introduction
The behaviour of a vertically di®erentiated monopolist has received a con-
siderable amount of attention in the literature. The main issue at stake
is whether a monopolist has any incentive to supply the same quality that
would be available under perfect competition (or social planning), or to dis-
tort it so as to induce self-selection on the part of consumers. The earliest
contributions (Spence, 1975; Sheshinski, 1976) deal with a single-product
monopolist whose cost function is convex in quality and linear in quantity.
The main conclusions reached here (Spence, 1975) are that (i) for a given
output level, quality is over or undersupplied by the monopolist as compared
to social planning, depending on whether the marginal valuation of quality is
above or below the average valuation of quality; if they coincide, the monop-
olist supplies the same quality as the social planner; and (ii) the monopolist
undersupplies quality if his output is close to the socially optimal one.
Several other contributions investigate a continuous model where the mo-
nopolist supplies a range of qualities, with a technology analogous to that
assumed in Spence (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Itoh, 1983; Maskin and Ri-
ley, 1984; Besanko, Donnenfeld and White, 1987; Champsaur and Rochet,
1989).1 All these authors emphasise that di®erentiation within her own prod-
uct range enables the monopolist to discriminate among buyers with di®erent
characteristics. In order to do so, the monopolist increases the slope of the
price-quality gradient compared to the social optimum. This is achieved by
o®ering a quality range broader than the one that would be available under
social planning or perfect competition. This points to the adoption of Min-
imum Quality Standards to correct quality distortion (Besanko, Donnenfeld
and White, 1987).
The latter statements apparently contrast with Spence's ¯ndings, accord-
ing to which the di®erence (or coincidence) between monopoly qualities and
their socially optimal levels depend upon the consumers' valuation of quality
itself, and the choice of which distortion to operate, whether in the quality
or the quantity dimension, is taken by the monopolist accordingly. In this
paper, I use a discrete model of a multiproduct monopolist sharing the same
basic features of the models employed in the above mentioned literature. I
derive the continuous case as the limit of the discrete model when the number
1See also White (1977). The case where the cost function involves a ¯xed cost of quality
improvement is analysed by Gabszewicz, Shaked, Sutton and Thisse (1986).
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of varieties tends to in¯nity, and prove that (i) there exists at least one case,
that of a uniform consumer distribution, where the continuous model follows
the rules identi¯ed by Spence; (ii) the continuous model lacks the crucial
information as to where the marginal consumer locates at equilibrium; this
produces the relevant consequence that partial market coverage is treated as
a case of full market coverage of a restricted population of consumers, yield-
ing quality distortion; (iii) the monopolist always operates a distortion in the
allocation of consumers across qualities, either by undersupplying qualities
or by pricing above marginal cost (thereby restricting output) while supply-
ing the socially optimal qualities. Then, since Spence's conclusions hold in
a continuous setting as well, the opportunity of a regulation policy based on
the adoption of an MQS must be reassessed, in that the considerations put
forward in the existing literature may not hold true, and there can be cases
where an MQS is completely ine®ective.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a
summary of the existing literature. The discrete model is presented in section
3. A discussion of the results and policy implications is in section 4. Section
5 contains concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries: review of the literature
Consider a population of consumers distributed over the interval [µ; µ] ac-
cording to a continuously di®erentiable distribution function F (µ): The asso-
ciated density function f(µ) is assumed positive everywhere over the support
[µ; µ]: Parameter µ denotes consumer's marginal willingness to pay for qual-
ity q 2 [0;1); produced at constant unit cost C(q); where C(q) is twice
continuously di®erentiable, with C(0) = 0; C 0(q) > 0; and C"(q) > 0: Total
production costs of variety q are ¡ = x ¢C(q); where x is the output level. In
the remainder of the analysis, it is assumed that the market is supplied by a
single ¯rm who is unable to observe the taste parameter µ:
Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good of quality q per period
of time. A generic consumer's utility function is de¯ned as follows:
U = y + V (q; µ); (1)
where y represents consumption of all other goods. The consumer buys if
net unit surplus is non-negative, i.e., if u(µ) = V (q; µ)¡p ¸ 0: I assume that
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V is thrice continuously di®erentiable2 for all q and µ; with (see Besanko,
Donnenfeld and White, 1987, p. 745; Champsaur and Rochet, 1989, pp.
536-542):
Assumption 1 V (0; µ) = V (q; 0) = 0:
Assumption 2 Vq(q; µ) > 0; Vqq(q; µ) · 0; @[qVqq=Vq]=@µ · 0:
Assumption 3 Vµ(q; µ) > 0 8q > 0; Vµµ(q; µ) · 0:
Assumption 4 Vµq(q; µ) ¸ 0; Vqµµ(q; µ) · 0:
A further assumption is adopted concerning the distribution function:
Assumption 5 (1¡ F (µ))=f(µ) is nonincreasing in µ:
2.1 The single-product monopolist
Spence (1975) and Sheshinski (1976) investigate the behaviour of a single-
product monopolist facing a continuum of consumers. The ¯rm chooses the
optimal quality q of the unique variety being supplied, and the price p (or
output x). The demand function for the product is
x =
Z µbµ f (µ)dµ; (2)
where bµ denotes the marginal willingness to pay of the marginal consumer. If
p=q > µ; then bµ > µ; i.e., the price-quality ratio at equilibrium is such that the
poorest consumer in the market is unable to buy, and partial market coverage
obtains. Otherwise, if p=q · µ; then bµ = µ; and full market coverage obtains,
with x = F (µ). The monopolist's pro¯t function is de¯ned as ¼ = (p¡C(q))x:
Consumer surplus is
CS =
Z µbµ uf (µ)dµ =
Z µbµ (V (q; µ)¡ p)f(µ)dµ; (3)
and social welfare is
SW = ¼ + CS: (4)
The following holds (see Spence, 1975, p. 419):
2Mussa and Rosen (1978, p.303) assume that V (q; µ) = µq:
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Proposition 1 For a given output level x, the monopolist undersupplies
quality compared to the social optimum if
1
x
Z µbµ @p@qdµ > @p@q ;
i.e., if the average valuation of quality (at the margin) is larger than the
marginal valuation of quality (at the margin), and conversely.
Moreover, the tendency of a monopolist to restrict the output level com-
pared to social planning, for a given quality, must also be accounted for.
Let xS and xM denote the output observed under social planning (or perfect
competition) and monopoly, respectively. Spence (1975, p. 421) establishes
that, if xM is near xS , then
1
xS
Z µbµ @p@qdµ > @p@q (xM ); (5)
and consequently
@SW
@q
jq=qM > 0; (6)
i.e., the derivative of social welfare in correspondence of the optimal monopoly
quality is positive, entailing that the monopolist undersupplies quality com-
pared to the social optimum. The reverse holds when xM is small.3
Therefore, the behaviour of the monopolist is determined by the inter-
play between (i) his incentive to produce a suboptimal quality, according
to the relationship between the marginal consumer's and the average con-
sumer's valuation of quality, and (ii) his incentive to restrict the output
level. On the one hand, the above Proposition implies that there exists a
class of consumers' distributions producing the coincidence between the mo-
nopolist's optimal quality and the socially e±cient one, i.e., those for which
(1=x)
R µbµ (@p=@q)dµ = @p=@q holds. This can be expected to be the case if
the monopolist restricts output. On the other, the monopolist may ¯nd it
pro¯table not to restrict output and discriminate among consumers by un-
dersupplying quality.
3The possibility that a monopolist oversupplies product quality is further investigated
in Donnenfeld and White (1988) and De Meza (1997).
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The incentive to distort the quality level depends on how the surplus that
the ¯rm may appropriate varies with quality. De¯ne
¼(q) = max
p
¼(p; q); SW (q) = max
p
SW (p; q) = SW (p = C 0(q); q) (7)
and
¯(q) =
¼(q)
SW (q)
; (8)
the slope of ¯(q) determines whether quality is over or undersupplied as
compared to the socially e±cient level. Taking logs and di®erentiating w.r.t.
q; one obtains
¯0(q)
¯(q)
=
¼0(q)
¼(q)
¡ SW
0
(q)
SW (q)
; (9)
implying that, when ¼0(q) = 0; ¯0(q)=¯(q) = ¡SW 0(q)=SW (q): This leads to
the following Proposition (Spence, 1975, p. 421):
Proposition 2 The pro¯t-maximising monopolist undersupplies quality com-
pared to the social optimum if ¯0(q) < 0; and conversely.
A corollary to the above result is that, when ¯0(q) = 0; the pro¯t-
maximising quality coincides with the socially optimal one. This is the case
when the inverse demand function is linear in the output level (Spence, 1975,
p. 422, fn. 7).
2.2 The multiproduct monopolist with a continuum of
qualities
Consider now the setting where the monopolist supplies a continuum of va-
rieties qi 2 [0;1): Alternatively to any qi; a consumer may purchase an
outside good whose quality is normalised to zero.4 The rationale behind this
assumption lies in the fact that otherwise the derivative of the pro¯t function
4This low-end alternative is assumed, either implicitly or explicitly, by Mussa and
Rosen (1978), Itoh (1983), Maskin and Riley (1984) and Besanko, Donnenfeld and White
(1987). The alternative at the high-end of the product spectrum is considered only by
Champsaur and Rochet (1989).
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w.r.t. price would be positive everywhere, entailing seemingly an in¯nitely
high price (see Champsaur and Rochet, 1989, p. 538).5
Being unable to observe each consumer type, the monopolist cannot per-
fectly discriminate. As a result, she sets price p(µ) so as to maximize pro¯ts
taking into account consumer's reaction, de¯ned as follows:
q(µ) = argmax
q¸0
V (q; µ)¡ p(µ): (10)
Then, writing the price schedule as p(µ) = V (q(µ); µ)¡u(µ); the monopolist's
problem translates into
max
q(µ);u(µ);µ^
Z µ
µ^
[V (q(µ); µ)¡ u(µ)¡ C(q(µ))] f(µ)dµ; (11)
subject to
u0(µ) = Vµ(q(µ); µ) 8µ 2 [µ^; µ]; (12)
q(µ) is nondecreasing (13)
u(µ^) = 0; and µ^ 2 [µ; µ] is the marginal willingness to pay of the marginal
consumer. This problem can be treated as an optimal control problem where
q(µ) is the control variable and u(µ) is the state variable, the relevant Hamil-
tonian being
H = [V (q; µ)¡ u¡C(q)] f (µ) + ¹Vµ(q; µ); (14)
where ¹ is the co-state variable associated with the constraint (12).
From the necessary ¯rst order conditions, one obtains that the optimal
quality assignment are given by the following expression (see Besanko, Don-
nenfeld and White, 1987, p. 748; Champsaur and Rochet, 1989, p. 540):
©(q; µ) = V (q; µ)¡C(q)¡ 1¡ F (µ)
f (µ)
Vµ(q; µ); (15)
leading these authors to state that monopoly deteriorates quality for all con-
sumers but those located at µ; and to sell a larger spectrum of varieties
5In the next section, I am going to show that the derivative of the pro¯t function w.r.t.
price is indeed always positive under full market coverage, but this does not imply that
the equilibrium price can be in¯nite.
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compared to the social optimum. In particular, the pro¯t-maximising mo-
nopolist enlarges the quality range downwards.6 The generic socially optimal
quality qS(µ) is de¯ned implicitly by the solution of the ¯rst order condition
Vq(q; µ)¡ C 0(q) = 0; (16)
under Assumption 4, qS(µ) is indeed nondecreasing. De¯ne the socially
e±cient range of product varieties as [qSL(
~µ); qSH(µ)]; where
~µ identi¯es the
marginal consumer under social planning; and the optimal monopoly range
as [qML (µ^); q
M
H (¹µ)]: The above discussion is summarised by the following
Remark 1 qSH(µ) = q
M
H (µ); q
S
L(
~µ) > qML (µ^); q
S(µ) > qM (µ) for all µ 2 (µ^; ¹µ);
and µ^ ¸ ~µ ¸ µ:
This is correct if the quality produced by the monopolist is nondecreasing
in µ; which in turn holds if the cross partial derivative ©qµ is positive. Other-
wise, bunching consumers with di®erent tastes onto the same variety becomes
optimal (see also Lemma 1 in Besanko, Donnenfeld and White, 1987, p. 749).
Finally, notice that the fourth inequality in Remark 1 establishes that the
monopolist may restrict the output level compared to the social optimum.
3 The discrete model
The analysis of (i) the single-product case, and (ii) the multiproduct case,
with a continuum of varieties leads to some contradictory conclusions. On the
one hand, the discrete model where a unique good is produced reveals that
the quality supplied by the monopolist can be lower, equal or higher than
the socially optimal quality, depending on consumers' tastes. Moreover, we
should expect the monopolist to distort quality downwards as output ap-
proaches the output observed under social planning. On the other hand, the
continuous model yields that the optimal quality range of a monopolist is
strictly larger than the e±cient product lines, and contains additional qual-
ities located between the lower bound of the socially optimal spectrum and
6Obviously, the opposite holds if the outside good is located at the high-end of the
quality spectrum.
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the outside good (Champsaur and Rochet, 1989, p. 540). Moreover, the so-
lution of the optimal control problem does not convey a clearcut information
as to the extent of market coverage.
Here, I am going to show that Spence's (1975) results hold in the multi-
product case as well. I will prove that distortion always obtains in that the
allocation of consumers across product varieties is distorted compared to the
social optimum, but this is not always the result of a distortion in qualities.
It can be the consequence of pricing above marginal cost (or restricting out-
put), while producing the same qualities a social planner would supply. In
order to analyse the multiproduct case where quality is a discrete variable, I
assume that
² qi 2 [0;1); i = 1; 2; 3:::n; qk ¸ qk¡1 for all k; k ¡ 1 2 f1; 2; 3:::ng ;
² V (q; µ) = µq; consequently, u(µ) = µq ¡ p;
² ¡i = tq2i xi; i.e., Ci(qi) = tq2i ; with t > 0;
² consumers are uniformly distributed with unit density over [µ; ¹µ]; with
µ > 0 and µ = ¹µ ¡ 1: Hence, f(µ) = 1: Observe that the uniform
distribution satis¯es Assumption 5.
For future reference, observe that the interval of consumers' preferred
varieties is [µ=(2t); ¹µ=(2t)] (see Cremer and Thisse, 1994; Lambertini, 1997).
The objective of the monopolist is to maximise w.r.t. prices and qualities
¦ =
nX
i=1
¼i =
nX
i=1
(pi ¡ tq2i )xi (17)
while that of the social planner consists in maximising
SW = ¦+
nX
i=1
Z µi+1
µi
u(µ)dµ =
nX
i=1
Z µi+1
µi
(µqi ¡ tq2i )dµ; (18)
where µi = (pi ¡ pi¡1)=(qi ¡ qi¡1) de¯nes the marginal willingness to pay
for quality of the consumer indi®erent between varieties i and i ¡ 1: All
individuals for which µ 2 (µi+1; µi) purchase variety i; all those for which
µ 2 (µi; µi¡1) purchase variety i ¡ 1; and so on. At the upper bound of the
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quality range, the demand for qn is xn = ¹µ ¡ (pn ¡ pn¡1)=(qn ¡ qn¡1); at the
lower bound, the demand for q1 is
x1 =
p2 ¡ p1
q2 ¡ q1 ¡Max
(
µ0 =
p1
q1
; µ
)
; (19)
i.e., either x1 = (p2 ¡ p1)=(q2 ¡ q1)¡ p1=q1 = (p2 ¡ p1)=(q2 ¡ q1)¡ µ0; under
partial market coverage, or x1 = (p2 ¡ p1)=(q2 ¡ q1) ¡ µ; under full market
coverage.
Several of the results that can be derived in this setting are in Lambertini
(1997). The reader interested in the details of the ensuing analysis is referred
to that paper.
3.1 Partial market coverage
When µ0 = p1=q1 > µ = µ ¡ 1; the poorest consumers are excluded from
consumption of any variety. The following holds:
Proposition 3 For any number of varieties n, the pro¯t-maximising mo-
nopolist produces the same qualities as the social planner, while supplying
half the output as the social planner, both overall and for each variety. In the
limit, as the number of varieties tends to in¯nity, the social planner serves
all the market, while the monopolist serves only the upper half.
The complete proof is in Lambertini (1997, pp. 116-118). Here, I will
resume some elements only. The intuition behind the result that, for any
given n, equilibrium qualities are the same under both regimes lies in the fact
that when the distribution is uniform and demands are linear, the average
valuation of quality coincides with the marginal valuation for quality (Spence,
1975; see above),7 and pi = qi(µ+tqi)=2:On this basis, the distortion operated
by the monopolist takes the usual form, i.e., an output restriction operated
through the price mechanism. Given the monopoly price-output decision,
it can be immediately veri¯ed that the ¯rst order condition relative to any
quality qi is the same under monopoly and social planning. Equilibrium
qualities, quantities and prices are summarised as follows:
qSi = q
M
i =
iµ
t(2n+ 1)
; i = 1; 2; 3:::n; (20)
7Straighforward calculations are needed to show that the same applies in the case of
the triangular distribution described by f(µ) = 2(µ ¡ µ):
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XM =
nX
i=1
xMi =
nµ
2n + 1
=
XS
2
; (21)
xMi =
XM
n
=
xSi
2
; i = 1; 2; 3:::n; (22)
pMi =
iµ
2
(2n+ i+ 1)
2t(2n+ 1)2
: (23)
On the basis of (22), the following result can be established:
Corollary 1 In the monopoly regime, for any n, xMn = x
S
n=2 consumers are
supplied with the same quality they would buy under social planning. All
remaining consumers purchase a lower quality than under social planning.
Since
lim
n!1x
M
n = 0;
as the number of varieties tends to in¯nity the consumer indexed by ¹µ is the
only one in a position to buy the same quality as under social planning.
As anticipated above, (20-22) hold if and only if the inequality µ0 > µ¡1
is satis¯ed. Consider the monopoly setting where a single variety is produced.
In this case, µM0 (1) = 2µ=3: When two varieties are produced, µ
M
0 (2) = 3µ=5;
when three varieties are produced, µM0 (3) = 4µ=7; and so on. In general,
Proposition 4 In the monopoly regime, the marginal willingness to pay for
quality of the consumer who is indi®erent between the lowest quality and the
outside good is µM0 (n) = (n + 1)µ=(2n + 1): Under social planning, µ
S
0 (n) =
µM0 (n)=2:
Proof. In order to prove the ¯rst statement in the above Proposition, two
alternative routes can be taken. The ¯rst consists in a simple argument
by induction. Note ¯rst that µM0 (n) = µ
M
0 (1) if a single good is supplied.
Then, observe that, in the case of n + 1 varieties, one obtains µM0 (n + 1) =
((n+1)+1)µ=(2(n+1)+1); de¯ning º = n+1; the former expression becomes
µM0 (º) = (º +1)µ=(2º+1), which di®ers from µ
M
0 (n) only for the presence of
º in place of n. The second consists in deriving the location of the marginal
consumer from (20-23) when i = 1: Then, the proof that µS0 (n) = µ
M
0 (n)=2
follows from the straightforward comparison between total outputs in (21).
Therefore, I can also state
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Corollary 2 Under monopoly (respectively, social planning), a necessary
and su±cient condition for partial market coverage to obtain is µM0 (n) > µ;
(respectively, µS0 (n) > µ) i.e., µ < (2n+1)=n (respectively, µ < (2n+1)=(2n)).
Consider the monopoly regime. The su±ciency relates, obviously, to the
condition that the pro¯t associated with partial market coverage be larger
than the pro¯t associated with full market coverage. A simple argument
su±ces to prove this. Consider that pro¯t maximisation requires the choice
by the monopolist of the price-quality ratio µM0 (n) = p1=q1 de¯ning the loca-
tion of the marginal consumer over the interval [µ; ¹µ]: If pro¯t maximisation
w.r.t. prices and quantities yields µM0 (n) > µ; this implies that the price-
quality schedule chosen by the monopolist is indeed optimal if and only if
µ < (2n + 1)=n: If the latter inequality is not satis¯ed, the monopolist must
take into account that the market is so rich that no consumer can be priced
out, i.e., full market coverage is to be expected from the outset. As to the
behaviour of the social planner, notice that the critical threshold of µ below
which the planner prices out some consumers is half the monopolist's critical
threshold. The policy implications of this result are discussed in section 4.
3.2 Full market coverage
Suppose all consumers are in a position to buy, so that XS = XM = F (µ) =
1: Demands are de¯ned as in the previous subsections (see 17-18), with x1 =
(p2 ¡ p1)=(q2 ¡ q1)¡ µ: Moreover, p1 = µq1: The following holds:
Proposition 5 As long as the number of varieties is ¯nite, the monopolist
undersupplies all qualities compared to the social optimum. As the number
of varieties tends to in¯nity, the highest quality coincides with the socially
optimal one, while the di®erence between the lowest monopoly quality and the
socially optimal one is increasing in the number of varieties and, in the limit,
is equal to the range of consumers' preferred qualities.
Again, the complete proof is in Lambertini (1997, pp. 112-116). The
lower and upper bounds of the pro¯t-maximising quality spectrum are
qM1 =
n(µ ¡ 2) + 1
2tn
; qMn =
nµ ¡ 1
2tn
; (24)
while the socially optimal bounds are
qS1 =
2n(µ ¡ 1) + 1
4tn
; qSn =
2nµ ¡ 1
4tn
: (25)
12
As a result, the degrees of di®erentiation in the two regimes are
qMn ¡ qM1 = ¢qM =
n ¡ 1
tn
; qSn ¡ qS1 = ¢qS =
n¡ 1
2tn
; (26)
with ¢qM = 2¢qS; and
lim
n!1¢q
M =
1
t
; lim
n!1¢q
S =
1
2t
: (27)
Hence, for a given output level, the distortion observed in the equilibrium
quality levels under monopoly increases as one moves downwards along the
quality spectrum. It is easily shown that
xMi = x
S
i =
1
n
: (28)
As a result, given that the output level of any variety is the same in both
regimes, undersupplying quality allows the monopolist to extract more sur-
plus from rich consumers. In the limit, the result of "no distortion at the
top" obtains:
lim
n!1(q
S
n ¡ qMn ) = 0; limn!1(q
S
1 ¡ qM1 ) =
1
2t
; (29)
while all qualities lower than qMn becomes more distorted as n increases.
Notice that the solution of the monopolist's problem when full market
coverage is assumed from the outset implies solving n ¡ 1 ¯rst order condi-
tions w.r.t. prices, since the price of the lowest quality is p1 = µq1: Although
known from the outset, this piece of information must be used after writing
the ¯rst order conditions concerning the n¡ 1 products above q1: Moreover,
p1 = µq1 coincides with the price charged on the lowest quality under par-
tial market coverage if and only if the location of the marginal consumer
under partial coverage coincides with the lower bound of the support of con-
sumers' distribution, i.e., µ0 = µ = ¹µ¡1. Finally, observe that, in the papers
analysing the continuous model, it is used from the outset the information
that the surplus enjoyed by the marginal consumer in equilibrium must be
nil, which ex post is indeed correct independently from the extent of mar-
ket coverage, but is appropriately used ex ante only if full market coverage
is expected to arise at equilibrium. Its use ex ante under partial market
coverage eliminates one degree of freedom and modi¯es ¯rst order condi-
tions, in that it transforms the optimisation problem under partial coverage
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into an optimisation problem under full coverage of a subset [µ^; ¹µ] of the
population of consumers. This procedure yields that the monopolist always
undersupplies all qualities, and prevents from explicitly locating the marginal
consumer along the support, thereby inducing to state that the monopolist
may or may not restrict the extent of market coverage as compared to social
planning or perfect competition.
4 Discussion and policy implications
I am now in a position to discuss the implications of the results derived in
the previous section. The comparison between monopoly and social planning
yields the following:
Proposition 6 For all µ ¸ (2n + 1)=n; full market coverage is observed
irrespectively of the market regime. For all µ < (2n + 1)=(2n); partial
market coverage is observed irrespectively of the market regime. For all
µ 2 [(2n + 1)=(2n); (2n+ 1)=n) ; the market is fully covered by the social
planner while it is only partially covered by the monopolist.
When partial market coverage emerges at the monopoly equilibrium,
qualities are the same as under social planning, i.e., they are undistorted.
However, a distortion observed in the allocation of consumer across qualities
is observed, due to the fact that price-quality gradient increases in the quality
level and output is reduced as compared to social planning. Conversely, un-
der full market coverage, the output level is not restricted, both overall and
for any single variety, and the allocation of consumers across qualities is dis-
torted by undersupplying each quality, but the top one in the limit when the
number of varieties tends to in¯nity and consequently the product spectrum
becomes continuous. Therefore, as the quality range becomes continuous,
the result of "no distortion at the top" is common to both settings. As long
as quality is discrete, i.e., for any ¯nite value of n; there exists a group of
consumers (those identi¯ed by µ 2 (µn; µ]) that, under partial market cover-
age, are able to buy the same quality irrespectively of the ¯rm's objective
function, although they obviously pay di®erent prices in the two cases. This
can never happen under full market coverage, if quality is a discrete variable.
To sum up, I can state
Proposition 7 Consider any ¯nite n. If µ < (2n + 1)=n; partial market
coverage obtains and the monopolist supplies the socially optimal qualities and
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distorts the allocation of consumers across qualities through the price vector,
for all values of µ except (µn; µ]. If µ ¸ (2n + 1)=n; full market coverage
obtains and the monopolist undersupplies all qualities, while producing the
same output as the social planner for any variety.
Proposition 8 As n tends to in¯nity and the quality range becomes con-
tinuous, partial market coverage obtains if µ < 2: Otherwise, the market is
fully covered. In both cases, there exists a unique consumer, located at µ;
purchasing the same quality as under social planning.
A few additional remarks are in order. First, if the market is relatively
poor, the monopolist ¯nds it optimal to restrict the output level, while the
quality spectrum coincides with the socially e±cient one. This implies that
the misallocation of consumers is operated by the usual tendency for the
monopoly to price above marginal cost. The distortion in qualities emerges
only if the market is so a²uent that no consumer can be pro¯tably priced
out. Second, since we can imagine that in real world situations the presence
of ¯xed costs in production prevents the quality range from becoming contin-
uous, we may reasonably expect to observe the former case rather than the
second, when the marginal valuation of quality coincides with the average
valuation of quality. Third, the above analysis has relevant implications con-
cerning the possibility of regulating the monopolist's behaviour through the
adoption of a Minimum Quality Standard (MQS). This policy is investigated
in the continuous setting by Besanko, Donnenfeld and White (1987). In the
light of the above discussion, the MQS is ine®ective under partial market
coverage, when qualities are not distorted. It can be used to raise the av-
erage quality available in the market either under full market coverage, or
under partial market coverage, provided the marginal valuation of quality is
lower than the average. Under the assumption that the lower bound of the
monopolist's product range is lower than the MQS, Besanko, Donnenfeld and
White (1987, Proposition 1, p. 750), ¯nd that consumers for whom the MQS
is not binding purchase the same quality as in the unregulated equilibrium,
while those for whom the MQS is binding receive a higher quality; moreover,
some consumers may be excluded from the market after the adoption of an
MQS. The ¯rst part of the statement is not generally true, in that the MQS
induces a change in the prices of all varieties and a consequent modi¯cation
in the assignment of consumers across qualities;8 the second part of the state-
8In Besanko, Donnenfeld and White (1988), the population of consumers consists in
two disjoint groups. In that case, it is indeed true that the introduction of the MQS a®ects
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ment can be true, but it implies that the MQS policy might be discontinued
if partial market coverage obtains.
Finally, a relevant policy implication of Proposition 6 is the following:
Corollary 3 If µ 2 [(2n+ 1)=(2n); (2n + 1)=n) ; an MQS can be adopted
only in combination with a price regulation such that the monopolist covers
the entire market, i.e., p1 = µ0q1:
This highlights that, used in isolation, an MQS policy may not be viable,
in that whenever the distortion operated by the monopolist takes the usual
form of a price increase (or output restriction) rather than a reduction in
quality, authorities should rather adopt policy measures explicitly tailored
on output or price, such as price caps or, perhaps, rate of return regulations.
5 Conclusions
Using a discrete model, I have shown that we should expect a monopolist
o®ering a vertically di®erentiated range of varieties of the same good to be-
have according to the rules found by Spence (1975). I have illustrated the
case where the distribution of consumers is uniform over a given support
representing marginal willingness to pay for quality. The continuous case is
obtained in the limit, as the number of varieties tends to in¯nity. The main
conclusion emerging from the continuous model, namely, that no distortion
at the top should be observed in equilibrium, i.e., all consumers but that (or
those) characterised by the highest valuation of quality should buy a lower
quality than under social planning, is quali¯ed by establishing whether the
market is fully or only partially served. Under partial market coverage, which
obtains whenever the market is su±ciently poor to induce the monopolist to
price so as to exclude some individuals from consumption, qualities coin-
cide with the socially optimal one and the misallocation of consumers across
qualities is entirely due to the price mechanism distorting output. Other-
wise, under full market coverage, which obtains when the monopolist cannot
pro¯t from pricing any consumer out because the market is too rich to allow
it, then no distortion in the output level can be operated and the misallo-
cation of consumers across varieties is due to the monopolist stretching the
quality range below the lower bound of the socially e±cient spectrum.
only the quality supplied to the low-income group of consumers.
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